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ABSTRACT
The use of TLS proxies to intercept encrypted traffic is con-
troversial since the same mechanism can be used for both
benevolent purposes, such as protecting against malware,
and for malicious purposes, such as identity theft or warrant-
less government surveillance. To understand the prevalence
and uses of these proxies, we build a TLS proxy measure-
ment tool and deploy it via Google AdWords campaigns. We
generate 15.2 million certificate tests across two large-scale
measurement studies. We find that 1 in 250 TLS connec-
tions are TLS-proxied. The majority of these proxies ap-
pear to be benevolent, however we identify over 3,600 cases
where eight malware products are using this technology ne-
fariously. We also find numerous instances of negligent, du-
plicitous, and suspicious behavior, some of which degrade
security for users without their knowledge. Distinguishing
these types of practices is challenging in practice, indicating
a need for transparency and user awareness.
1. INTRODUCTION
Secure communication on the Internet is based primar-
ily on digital certificates signed by certificate authorities
and intermediate authorities. This validation system is
currently being compromised by the use of TLS proxies,
which can act as a man-in-the-middle (MitM) for TLS
connections (e.g., [9, 37, 20, 11, 43]). A TLS proxy can
issue a substitute certificate for any site the user visits,
so that the user establishes an encrypted connection to
the proxy rather than the desired web site. The proxy
can then decrypt and monitor or modify all user traffic,
before passing it along via a second encrypted channel to
the desired web site. TLS proxies are used for a variety
of legitimate purposes, such as blocking malware, but
can also be used by malicious entities to compromise
the privacy or security of end users. Isolated attacks
had been observed in the wild, notably in Iran [1] and
Syria [14]. The most dangerous aspect of TLS proxies
is that the user is entirely unaware that encrypted traf-
fic is being intercepted by an organization or attacker.
The use of TLS proxies is controversial because browser
software still shows a lock icon during such sessions, mis-
leading users and compromising the end-to-end security
promises made by TLS.
Detecting the presence and prevalence of TLS prox-
ies is a challenging measurement problem. To detect a
proxy, we must obtain the certificate a client, such as a
web browser, actually obtains, then compare this with
the valid certificate presented by the server the client
is contacting. A mismatch indicates that some kind of
proxy, either benevolent or malicious, is intercepting the
client’s traffic to that particular server. To determine the
prevalence of TLS proxies, we must repeat this measure-
ment on as many client systems as possible. A variety
of studies have examined the certificate ecosystem by
scanning secure servers from a single point of view [22,
15, 13] or using passive monitors from several vantage
points [15, 5]. However, detecting proxies necessitates
measurements at the client, and less work has been done
in this space.
Two recent works have found some evidence for TLS
proxies by measuring certificates received by clients.
Huang et al. measure the prevalence of TLS proxies
that intercept traffic from clients connecting to Facebook
[24], finding that 1 in 500 TLS connections are proxied,
mostly by corporate Internet filters and personal an-
tivirus software. In addition, a small number of connec-
tions were found to be intercepted by malware. Because
this study uses Flash to detect a certificate mismatch,
it does not detect proxies affecting most mobile devices.
The Netalyzer project measured certificates received by
Android apps, assessing 15,000 sessions and identifying
just one case of a TLS proxy running in an analytics
app [45]. Though this is a very low rate of prevalence
(30 times less than Huang’s study), the app was found
to whitelist several sites, including Facebook. This in-
dicates that measurements of proxies should examine
low-profile sites that are unlikely to be whitelisted.
In this paper, we report on our measurements of
the prevalence of proxies using a Flash app deployed
with a Google AdWords campaign. Like Huang, our
measurements use Flash to detect a certificate mismatch
without any user interaction. However, we deploy our
tool using a Google AdWords campaign, which affords
a number of advantages. First, we are able to actively
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measure clients, based on how much money we spend on
the advertisement, enabling us to collect as many as 12
million measurements in one week by spending $750 per
day. Second, we are able to target our measurements at
any country, so that we can measure proxy prevalence
in distinct areas of the world. Third, we are able to
measure any site that has a permissive Flash socket
policy file. Together, these characteristics give us a
broader view of TLS proxies on the Internet, including
those that may have whitelisted Facebook.
In this paper, we report on a two-part measurement
study of TLS proxies using a Google AdWords campaign.
The first part of the study measures proxies broadly,
wherever Google places our advertisement, comprising
2.9 million certificate tests, with proxied users in 142
countries. The second part of the study specifically
targets users in five countries (China, Ukraine, Russia,
Egypt, and Pakistan) in addition to the world at large.
This covers 12.3 million certificate tests, finding proxied
users in 147 countries. The first part measures proxies
intercepting traffic to a new server on our campus, which
is highly unlikely to be whitelisted by any proxy. The
second part measures proxies intercepting traffic to sev-
enteen sites on the Alexa top million in addition to our
own server. We are able to scan these seventeen sites
because they have permissive Flash socket policy files;
scans of the entire Alexa top million are not possible
without installing new software on client machines.
Our basic findings are as follows:
• The first part of our study found 11,764 proxied
connections out of 2.9 million total measurements
(0.41% or approximately 1/250 of all connections)
spanning 142 countries. This rate is double that
reported by Huang. We found that most substi-
tute certificates claim to be from benevolent TLS
proxies, with 70.87% claiming to be generated by
a firewall software and 12.66% claiming to be gen-
erated by a corporate network.
• The second part of our study, which queried mul-
tiple secure hosts, found 50,761 proxied connec-
tions out of 12.3 million total measurements (again,
0.41% of all connections) spanning 147 countries. It
is surprising that the overall prevalence is identical
in both studies, which seems to indicate that none
of the sites we tested was whitelisted by proxies.
• Our second study targeted specific countries with
the Google AdWords placement. We find that
proxy rates vary significantly with respect to the
origin country of the user. China has an exception-
ally low rate of TLS proxies whereas the United
States and other western nations tend to have much
higher rates of TLS proxies. Targeted countries
also have a greater rate of unclassifiable TLS prox-
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Figure 1: High-level view of secure session es-
tablishment via TLS
ies that disclose little to no information about their
nature.
• In both studies we found numerous instances of neg-
ligent and malicious behavior. Our analysis of one
parental filter finds that it masks forged certificates,
allowing an attacker to easily perform a MitM at-
tack against the firewall’s users. In addition, we
found eight malware products affecting over 3,600
connections that install a new root certificate and
act as a TLS proxy to dynamically insert advertise-
ments on secure sites. We also found evidence that
spammers are using TLS proxies in their products
and that botnets may be using this technique. We
found numerous other suspicious circumstances in
substitute certificates, such as a null Issuer Orga-
nization, falsified certificate authority signatures,
and downgraded public key sizes.
2. BACKGROUND
To validate the identity of a website such as Amazon,
the web browser relies on certificate authorities (CAs),
which digitally sign certificates vouching for the identity
of the web server. Figure 1 provides a high-level overview
of a TLS handshake where the browser initiates a TLS
connection with the server, and retrieves the server’s
certificate. The browser verifies this certificate and, if it
is valid, sends random data securely to the server that is
used to seed the generation of the necessary encryption
keys. The browser and the server can now exchange
encrypted traffic.
Web browsers authenticate a site by validating a chain
of digital signatures from the site’s certificate back to one
of a set of trusted root certificates. These certificates
comprise the “root store” and are typically bundled
with the operating system or browser. For example, the
certificate for www.google.com is signed by the Google
Internet Authority G2, an intermediate certificate au-
thority run by Google. This certificate is in turn signed
by GeoTrust Global CA, a certificate authority whose
certificate is located in the root store of the browser or
operating system. This is exemplified in Figure 2(a).
The legitimate certificate for google.com is accepted be-
cause it has a valid chain of signatures leading back to a
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Figure 2: Certificate validation. Part (a) shows
expected behavior when the www.google.com
webserver provides its certificate to the browser
for validation. The certificate’s signature is
validation against an intermediate certificate,
Google Internet Authority G2, which is in turn
signed by a certificate in the trusted root store.
Part (b) shows a substitute certificate invali-
dated due to lack of any signatures leading back
to a root certificate. Part (c) shows a validated
substitute certificate issued by a rogue or com-
promised certificate authority (left arrow) and
a validated substitute certificate signed by an
authority who injected a new trusted certificate
into the root store.
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Figure 3: “Secure” session establishment with
involving a TLS proxy
trusted certificate in the root store. Figure 2(b) shows
a case where a substitute certificate’s signature cannot
be traced back to a root store certificate and is rejected.
This is expected behavior for substitute certificates.
This system can be attacked by a TLS proxy inserting
itself as a man-in-the-middle between the browser and
the web server. As shown in Figure 3, when the browser
tries to open a secure connection to the web server, this
connection is instead intercepted by the proxy. The
proxy also provides a falsified, substitute certificate to
the browser, so that it can impersonate the original
website. For this to work, the proxy must somehow
control a substitute certificate for the original website
that validates against the root store of the user. This
can be accomplished in a variety of ways, both benign
and malicious.
Figure 2(c) illustrates two ways the operator of a proxy
can provide valid certificates that do not elicit a browser
warning. One way (indicated by the vertical arrow) is
to directly insert a certificate into the trusted root store.
For example, an organization can use enterprise software
to supply its own certificates for the root store of all
computers in the organization. Alternatively, the IT
department of an organization can create a software
image using new root certificates and require that all
computers in the organization use this image. This is
generally done for benevolent reasons, such as blocking
malware and viruses, providing intrusion detection, or
protecting intellectual property. Likewise, personal fire-
wall software often installs a new root certificate so that
it can offer users the feature of scanning their encrypted
traffic for malware. Finally, in the case of mobile devices,
a manufacturer may add certificates to the root store,
ostensibly for speeding up web browsing. Nokia came
under fire recently for doing this [36].
Other ways of providing seemingly-valid certificates
are more nefarious. A malicious entity can also install
new certificates into an operating system’s root store.
For example, malware typically has permission to add
new certificates when it is installed inadvertently by the
user. Sometimes this may be as simple as asking the
user for install privileges, and many users are trained to
click ”OK” whenever the operating system asks them
for this. It is even possible for a malicious entity to act
as a proxy without adding any new certificates to a vic-
tim’s root store. This is shown by the left-leaning arrow
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Figure 4: TLS Proxy Measurement
from the certificate in Figure 2(c). A rogue certificate
authority can issue any certificate it wants, since all root
certificates are allowed to sign for any domain. There
have also been numerous reported cases of compromised
and negligent certificate authorities that allow attackers
to issue fraudulent certificates [13]. In addition, some
governments, such as China and the United States, con-
trol their own root certificate authorities, and evidence
suggests that a government may coerce authorities into
granting them certificates for domains they do not own
[32, 15].
In summary, a TLS proxy can be operated by both
malicious and benign parties including parental con-
trol software, corporate firewalls, malware, hackers, and
government surveillance operatives.
3. MEASUREMENT TOOL
We have developed a tool to measure the prevalence of
TLS proxies using existing, widely-deployed technologies.
The tool runs silently from the perspective of the user; no
user action is required, either to install any software or to
interact with the tool. This is a significant advantage as
compared to other work that requires client-side software
installation [46, 32, 4, 23, 6, 7].
3.1 Design
To meet our objective of using existing browser tech-
nologies without requiring further client installation,
we take advantage of the widespread deployment and
transparency afforded by the Adobe Flash runtime. By
hosting a Flash application on a web page the server
can upload it to a visiting client, which runs it with-
out any user interaction. Our tool works by sending
a ClientHello message to a TLS-enabled server and
recording the ServerHello and Certificate messages
received in response. The retrieved certificate(s) is then
forwarded to the web server for verification. This process
is handled in three steps, illustrated in Figure 4:
1. Retrieve measurement tool. The client browser
connects to the web server where the Flash applica-
tion is hosted. The application need not be visible
to the user and can merely be embedded in the
background of an otherwise normal web page. The
web page data, along with the embedded Flash
application, is then downloaded by the client.
2. Record certificate. The Flash tool is run au-
tomatically by the browser. The tool sends a
ClientHello message back to the server to ini-
tiate a TLS handshake. The tool then records the
ServerHello and Certificate messages received
in response and terminates the handshake.
3. Report results. The tool reports these results
back to the server using an HTTP POST request.
The server then compares the certificate received
with the original it sent. A mismatch indicates the
presence of a TLS proxy.
To deploy our tool a website administrator need only
do the following:
1. Host the Flash application on the web server
and invoke it from the desired pages. The tool
can be deployed transparently within existing web
pages with no visible changes.
2. Host a simple “socket policy file” on the
server. For security reasons the Flash runtime
requires that applications attempting to establish
a TCP connection with a remote host first obtain
permission from that host via a simple policy file.
The request for this file is sent automatically by
the Flash runtime. The software to host such a
file is extremely simple and easily deployed. This
particular security feature of Flash prohibits the
tool from testing client connections to arbitrary
hosts; all hosts tested must first grant permission
through their respective socket policy files. We
serve our socket policy file on the same port used
by our web server (80). This reduces the effect of
captive portals, which often block traffic targeting
ports other than those used by HTTP and HTTPS
(e.g., airport public access WiFi). Our socket policy
server implementation is provided on our website.
3.2 Implementation
To implement our tool it was necessary to retrieve
the certificate used during a TLS handshake. It would
have been preferable to use JavaScript or HTML5 to
retrieve the certificate used as part of a current TLS
connection, but unfortunately there is no API available
for this. Firefox allows a plugin to request the certificate,
but plugins require manual client installation. This left
us with the alternative of establishing a plain TCP
connection with the target server and then initiating
a TLS handshake. Unfortunately, the ability to use
a plain TCP connection rules out the use of HTML5
WebSockets.
Due to these constraints, we opted to use the Adobe
Flash platform. Beginning with version 11.0 of the Flash
runtime, Adobe made available a SecureSockets API
that allows developers to access certificate data from a
4
TLS connection. However, these versions of Flash were
too recent to enjoy the reported 98.9% desktop market
penetration of Flash 9.0 [2]. Thus we implemented our
tool in ActionScript using only libraries supported by
the Flash 9.0 runtime. Using the Socket API provided
by Flash 9.0 we implemented functionality required to
perform a partial TLS handshake. After receiving the
full Certificate message from the desired host the
handshake is aborted and the connection is closed. The
Flash application records and parses all certificates re-
ceived from the Certificate message (as some hosts
offer certificate chains) and stores them locally until it
parses the final one. All certificate data, in PEM for-
mat, is concatenated and then sent as an HTTP POST
request back to the host for analysis.
Code for the measurement tool and collected datasets
will be available for download at https://tlsresearch.
byu.edu.
3.3 Limitations
Our tool is unable to measure TLS proxies being used
against most mobile devices. An overwhelming majority
of mobile platforms do not support Flash and Adobe
has discontinued their development of Flash for mobile
devices.
It is possible that TLS proxies could be engineered to
circumvent our measurements. At the time of our study,
our measurement methodology was not well known, so
it is unlikely that any attacker was evading detection
or tampering with our reports. However, in the case
that this methodology becomes well-known, it would be
difficult to prevent dedicated attackers from modifying
their TLS proxies to avoid our measurements.
4. GOOGLE ADWORDS CAMPAIGNS
To achieve rapid and widespread deployment of our
measurement tool we leveraged the Google AdWords
platform. This strategy for using an advertising cam-
paign to conduct an end-user measurement study has
previously been used to study CSRF attacks [8], DNS
rebinding attacks [27], and DNSSEC deployment [25,
26, 30]. Our study is the first to use this same method
to measure the deployment of TLS proxies. The results
from this study shed light on the legitimate demand for
TLS proxies as well as several suspicious or duplicitous
practices.
The deployment of the measurement tool is given in
Figure 5. Deployment responsibilities were delegated to
the Google AdWords platform, while all reports from
the tool were sent back to a reporting server we con-
trolled. To accommodate placement in advertisements,
our measurement tool was modified to contain a visible
canvas on which we place a simplistic advertisement for
our research lab. Figure 6 shows the advertisement as it
appeared to web users during our measurement study.
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Figure 5: Using an Ad Server for TLS Proxy
Measurement
Figure 6: Appearance of tool via Google Ad-
Words
Our measurement tool was run as soon as user’s browsers
loaded the advertisement, and required no interaction
from the users.
For our ad campaigns we leveraged the CPM (cost-
per-impression) bidding model for our campaign, which
maximizes the number of unique clients presented with
our ad. We set the Max. CPM to $10 USD. To help us
reach a global audience we indicated that our ad should
be served to all locations and languages. Additionally,
since ads are shown only on websites that match a set of
designated keywords we selected our keywords based on
phrases that were currently trending globally on Google
Trends [19]. We set our ad to show uniformly throughout
the day so as to collect data from users in a variety of
locations and situations (e.g., home, commuting, work).
Along with the certificate, we also recorded the IP
address of the client tested. This IP address was then
used to query the MaxMind GeoLite [34] database to
gather geolocation information.
4.1 Campaign Setup for First Study
Our initial Google AdWords advertising campaign ran
from January 6, 2014 to January 30, 2014. During the
first 17 days of the study we varied the amount of money
allocated to the ad campaign, but for the last week we
kept it at $500/day. In this study we only gathered
certificate data for our own website, tlsresearch.byu.edu.
We used the following keywords for the study: “Nelson
Mandela”, “Sports”, “Basketball”, “NSA”, “Internet”,
“Freedom”, “Paul Walker”, “Security”, “LeBron James”,
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Website
Top 25,000 Business Porn
qq.com airdroid.com pornclipstv.com
promodj.com webhost1.ru porno-be.com
idwebgame.com restaurantesecia.com.br pornbasetube.com
parsnews.com speedtest.net.in pornozip.net
idgameland.com iprank.ir pornorasskazov.net
vcp.ir
Table 1: Second Study Websites Probed
“Haiyan”, “Snowden”, “PlayStation 4”, “Miley Cyrus”,
“Xbox One”, “iPhone 5s”.
This initial campaign generated 4,634,386 impressions
and 3,897 clicks (not required to complete the measure-
ment) at a cost of $4,911.97. In total we completed
2,861,244 successful measurements.
Section 5 discusses the results from this first study.
4.2 Campaign Setup for Second Study
To increase the number of measurements collected
and to better understand the nature of TLS proxies we
conducted a second set of measurements approximately
eight months after the first study.
One question unanswered by the first study was whether
TLS proxies were intercepting all traffic, or whether they
selectively intercepted traffic according to white or black-
lists. To shed light on this subject, we decided to gather
measurements for different types of sites:
• Popular: Sites from the Alexa top 25,000. Six
websites were included in this category.
• Business: Commercial sites unlikely to be blocked
by places of business. Five websites were included
in this category.
• Pornographic: Pornographic websites (expected
to be blocked by parental filters and places of busi-
ness). Five websites are included in this category.
• Authors’: The single website operated by the
authors and also used in the first measurement
study.
The policy restrictions of the Flash runtime prohibit
establishment of socket connections to arbitrary hosts.
Thus all sites used in our study had to host permissive
“socket policy files” that allowed connections to port
443 from any domain. We scanned for the presence
of permissive socket policy files on the entirety of the
Alexa top 1 million websites, and selected the highest
ranked such websites for each type to use in the second
measurement. Table 1 lists the additional hosts we
probed.
At most 17 of these sites were queried by a single
served instance of our Flash measurement tool. Due to
differences in Internet connectivity quality and hardware
Campaign Impressions Click Cost
Global 3,285,598 5,424 $4,021.78
China 689,233 652 $401.41
Egypt 232,218 1,777 $378.17
Pakistan 183,849 2,536 $378.26
Russia 230,474 203 $401.36
Ukraine 364,868 294 $390.69
Total 5,079,298 11,077 $6,090.19
Table 2: Second Study Statistics
and software performance, not all clients served with our
ad were able to successfully perform TLS handshakes
with all hosts. The tool was configured to first test the
connection to the authors’ website, before attempting
to test connections to the other hosts in parallel.
In this second study, we also targeted specific countries
by creating an additional ad campaign for each country.
The ad image used in both the global and country specific
ad campaigns was the same. Some of the countries we
wanted to target were unavailable in Google AdWords
(e.g., Iran, Syria) and after discussion we settled on the
following five countries: China, Egypt, Pakistan, Russia,
and Ukraine.
The second study ran from October 8, 2014 4:00 PM
MDT to October 15, 2014 4:00 PM MDT. The budget
for the global campaign was $500/day and the country-
specific campaigns were $50/day. We used the following
keywords for the study: “Nelson Mandela”, “Sports”,
“Internet Security”, “Basketball”, “Football”, “Freedom”,
“NCAA”, “Paul Walker”, “Boston Marathon”, “Elec-
tion”, “North Korea”, “Harlem Shake”, “PlayStation 4”,
“Royal Baby”, “Cory Monteith”, “iPhone 6”, “iPhone
5s”, “Samsung Galaxy S4”, “iPhone 6 Plus”, “TLS
Proxies”.
The breakdown of costs and results are given in Ta-
ble 2. In total we completed 12,314,756 successful mea-
surements.
Section 6 discusses the results from this second study.
5. INITIAL MEASUREMENT STUDY
Our first measurement study was targeted at a gen-
eral global audience. During the duration of this ad
campaign, we served 4.36 million ads and successfully
completed 2.86 million measurements. Of those tests,
11,764 returned a different X.509 certificate than was
served by our secure web server, indicating the presence
of a TLS proxy.
The users behind a proxied connection that were iden-
tified by our campaign originated in 142 countries and
from 8,589 distinct IP addresses. Due to the targeting
algorithms used by Google AdWords, our tool’s exposure
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Rank Country Proxied Total Percent
1 US 2,252 285,078 0.79%
2 Brazil 2,041 298,618 0.68%
3 France 812 74,789 1.09%
4 UK 759 259,971 0.29%
5 Romania 696 94,116 0.74%
6 Germany 499 187,805 0.27%
7 Canada 303 34,695 0.87%
8 Turkey 303 65,195 0.46%
9 India 302 51,348 0.59%
10 Spain 226 62,569 0.36%
11 Russia 224 58,402 0.38%
12 Italy 200 129,358 0.15%
13 S.Korea 196 46,660 0.42%
14 Portugal 185 29,799 0.62%
15 Poland 182 110,550 0.16%
16 Ukraine 160 61,431 0.26%
17 Belgium 136 16,816 0.81%
18 Japan 111 31,751 0.35%
19 Netherlands 104 31,938 0.33%
20 Taiwan 101 61,195 0.17%
Other (215) 1,972 869,096 0.23%
Total 11,764 2,861,180 0.41%
Table 3: Proxied connections by country (1st
study)
to these countries is not uniformly distributed. Table 3
shows the countries with the most proxied connections
in our study. For each country, the table lists the to-
tal number of proxied connections, the total number of
connections, and the percentage of total connections to
that country that were proxied. Some countries have
significantly higher percentages of proxied connections
than the average, including France (1.09%), Canada
(0.87%), Belgium (0.81%), the United States (0.79%),
and Romania (0.74%). Together, connections from the
United States and Brazil account for 36% of detected
proxies.
5.1 Analysis of Issuer Organization
We first analyze the contents of the Issuer Organiza-
tion in the substitute certificates we collected. We use
OpenSSL to decode the certificates and store them in a
database, where we can run queries. We also manually
inspect the contents of the relevant fields to identify the
issuing organization and their software products, using
web searches to determine their identity. We empha-
size that our results in this section are based on the
intercepting proxy self-identifying themselves in the cer-
Rank Issuer Organization Connections
1 Bitdefender 4,788
2 PSafe Tecnologia S.A. 1,200
3 Sendori Inc 966
4 ESET spol. s r. o. 927
5 Null 829
6 Kaspersky Lab ZAO 589
7 Fortinet 310
8 Kurupira.NET 267
9 POSCO 167
10 Qustodio 109
11 WebMakerPlus Ltd 95
12 Southern Company Services 62
13 NordNet 61
14 Target Corporation 52
15 DigiCert Inc 49
16 ContentWatch, Inc. 42
17 NetSpark, Inc. 42
18 Sweesh LTD 39
19 IBRD 26
20 Cloud Services 23
Other (332) 1,121
Table 4: Issuer Organization field values
tificate. It is certainly possible that malicious proxies
have hidden their tracks by masquerading as a legitimate
organization in the Issuer Organization field, and we
cannot detect this.
Table 4 shows the values for the Issuer Organization
field of the substitute certificates. Table 5 provides
a breakdown of values present in the Issuer Organiza-
tion field of the substitute certificates. The majority
of certificates from proxied connections have an Issuer
Organization field matching the name of a personal
or enterprise firewall (69.54%). Another 12.66% have
the name of an organization set as the Issuer Organi-
zation (e.g., Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
Lincoln Financial Group). Additionally, 7% (829) of
the substitute certificates have null values for the Issuer
Organization field.
The most suspicious activities discovered were re-
vealed by certificates with an Issuer Organization that
matched the names of malware. “Sendori, Inc”, “Web-
MakerPlus Ltd”, and “IopFailZeroAccessCreate” ap-
peared in 966, 95, and 21 Issuer Organization fields,
respectively. Sendori poses as a legitimate enterprise,
however they produce software that compromises the
DNS lookup of infected machines, allowing them to redi-
rect users to improper hosts. A TLS proxy component is
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Proxy Type Connections Percent
Business/Personal Firewall 8,101 68.86%
Business Firewall 69 0.59%
Personal Firewall 11 0.09%
Parental Control 156 1.33%
Organization 1,394 12.66%
School 32 0.27%
Malware 1,112 8.65%
Unknown 840 7.14%
Telecom 0 0%
Certificate Authority 49 0.42%
Table 5: Classification of claimed issuer in 1st
study
used to bypass host authenticity warnings in the browser.
The substitute certificates generated by the TLS proxy
are signed by a root authority that was added to the
root store of the local machine at the time of infection.
Substitute certificates issued by Sendori originated from
30 distinct countries.
The WebMakerPlus malware is primarily associated
with inserting advertisements into Web pages. Since
modern browsers issue warnings when insecure content
is queried from secure connections, we hypothesize that
WebMakerPlus uses a TLS proxy to simulate that their
advertisements are served from a secure connection. Sub-
stitute certificates containing markings for WebMaker-
Plus originated from 16 distinct countries.
Manual Internet queries revealed that malware was
responsible for an Issuer Common Name field value of
“IopFailZeroAccessCreate”. The certificates containing
this value originated from 14 distinct countries. Dis-
turbingly, each certificate contained the same 512-bit
public key. This malware was also reported by [24].
It is somewhat surprising that these malware programs
self-identify in the substitute certificates they generate,
as an attacker can arbitrarily select values for the fields
in a substitute certificate.
In addition to malware discoveries, we found that the
names of two companies highly associated with spam
were also present in numerous Issuer Organization fields.
The names “Sweesh LTD”, and “AtomPark Software
Inc” were found in 39 and 20 substitute certificates,
respectively. AtomPark offers tools for spammers in-
cluding “email extractors” and “bulk mailers”. Sweesh
offers services to spammers to overcome “hurdles” faced
by advertisers and publishers. Internet searches reveal
that Sweesh may be responsible for the development of
WebMakerPlus.
5.2 Negligent Behavior
Where possible, we installed and characterized per-
sonal firewall software from many of the most common
companies whose names were provided in the Issuer
Organization, Issuer Organizational Unit, and Issuer
Common Name fields of our collected certificates. We
characterized the behavior of these solutions when run-
ning behind our own TLS proxy which issued certificates
signed by an untrusted CA. While most solutions prop-
erly rejected our forged certificates, Kurupira, a parental
filter that is responsible for 267 proxied connections in
our dataset, did not. When visiting google.com and
gmail.com, Kurupira replaced our untrusted certificate
with a signed trusted one, thus allowing attackers to per-
form a transparent man-in-the-middle attack against Ku-
rupira users without having to compromise root stores.
In contrast, BitDefender not only blocked this forged
certificate, but also blocked a forged certificate that re-
solved to a new root we installed in the victim machine’s
root store.
Among the negligent behavior we found are TLS prox-
ies that generate substitute certificates with weak crypto-
graphic strength. Our original certificate has a public key
size of 2048 bits. However, we find that 5,951 (50.59%)
substitute certificates have public key sizes of 1024 bits
and 21 certificates have public key sizes of 512 bits. 23
(0.20%) TLS proxies generated substitute certificates
that used MD5 for signing, 21 (0.18%) which were also
512 bit keys. Interestingly, some TLS proxies generated
certificates that have better cryptographic strength than
our certificate. Seven (0.06%) used certificates with
a key size of 2432 and five (0.04%) used SHA-256 for
signing.
In addition to problems with cryptographic strength,
we discovered that 49 (0.42%) substitute certificates
claim to be signed by DigiCert, though none of them
actually are. The original certificate from our secure
web server is issued by DigiCert High Assurance CA-3,
indicating the TLS proxy likely copied this field when
creating the substitute. It is alarming that a TLS proxy
would opt to copy this field, as it signifies a masquerading
as the legitimate authority. It is possible that these
proxies are operated by malicious individuals doing their
best to not be detected by the user.
Finally, we note that 110 substitute certificates have
modifications to the subject field. For 51 (0.43%) certifi-
cates, the subject did not match our website’s domain.
In many cases a wildcarded IP address was used that
only designated the subnet of our website. In two cases
the substitute certificate is issued to the wrong domain
entirely: mail.google.com and urs.microsoft.com.
These certificates appear to be legitimate for those do-
mains and properly validate back to GeoTrust and Cy-
bertrust roots, respectively.
6. SECOND MEASUREMENT STUDY
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Proxy Type Connections Percent
Business/Personal Firewall 36,005 70.93%
Business Firewall 1,231 2.43%
Personal Firewall 536 1.06%
Parental Control 428 0.84%
Organization 3,531 6.96%
School 482 0.95%
Malware 2,571 5.06%
Unknown 5,455 10.75%
Telecom 447 0.88%
Certificate Authority 68 0.13%
Table 6: Classification of claimed issuer in 2nd
study
During the duration of this second ad campaign we
successfully completed 12.3 million measurements target-
ing five specific countries as well as the world in general.
Of those tests, 50,761 returned a different X.509 certifi-
cate than was served by the authoritative host.
6.1 Analysis of Issuer Organization
Table 6 contains the breakdown of Issuer Organiza-
tion fields from our second measurement study. As
in our first measurement study, we find that the ma-
jority of TLS proxies claim to be features of firewall
solutions (74.42%). Organization and school names are
also prevalent, accounting for another 6.01% of Issuer
Organization values. However, we see an increase in
the relative popularity of the “Unknown” as compared
to the first study (10.75% from 7.14%). The Unknown
category comprises certificates with null or blank issuer
fields, or otherwise uncategorizable values. In tandem
with this finding we note that the Malware category has
decreased in relative popularity from 8.65% to 5.06%.
These results were obtained largely from our five tar-
geted countries. The increase in the Unknown category
of TLS proxies proxying these countries is alarming. It
is possible that malware using TLS proxy features in
these regions is more opaque than its earlier counter-
parts, opting not to disclose its identity through Issuer
Organization fields. Even if this is not the case, it is
alarming to note that TLS proxies may be decreasing
their already-poor visibility to users in those countries.
Another distinguishing feature of our second study’s
Issuer Organization fields is the presence of the names of
Telecom companies in the dataset. We found 375 prox-
ied connections from IP addresses owned by a Korean
telecom company, LG UPLUS. Another four telecom
company names were reported from an additional 72
connections. It is unclear whether LG UPLUS and the
other companies are using TLS proxies within their own
Rank Country Proxied Total Percent
1 China 563 2,549,301 0.02%
2 Ukraine 4,329 1,575,053 0.27%
3 Russia 4,532 1,116,341 0.40%
4 Korea 1,722 836,556 0.21%
5 Egypt 3,720 660,937 0.56%
6 Pakistan 1,890 456,792 0.41%
7 Turkey 1,975 411,962 0.48%
8 US 3,327 385,811 0.86%
9 Japan 2,033 273,532 0.74%
10 UK 2,056 266,873 0.77%
11 Brazil 1,889 232,454 0.81%
12 Taiwan 530 186,942 0.28%
13 Romania 2,210 185,749 1.19%
14 Indonesia 798 181,971 0.44%
15 Germany 1,091 177,586 0.61%
16 Italy 737 145,438 0.50%
17 Greece 516 130,613 0.40%
18 Poland 456 127,806 0.36%
19 Czech Rep. 343 110,170 0.31%
20 India 716 102,869 0.70%
Other (209) 15,328 2,200,000 0.70%
Total 50,761 12,314,756 0.41%
Table 7: Connections tested by country (2nd
study)
office buildings or using them to intercept the traffic
of their own users. The latter behavior is not without
precedent; Nokia has recently come under fire for such
an operation [36].
6.2 Proxy prevalence by specific country
Our second measurement study via AdWords con-
tained six mini-campaigns. Five of these targeted the
countries of China, Ukraine, Russia, Egypt, and Pak-
istan. These countries were selected for their contem-
porary civil struggles and their respective governments’
stance on free speech. The final mini-campaign targeted
the world in general. Table 7 shows a breakdown of the
number of connections tested per country. We immedi-
ately see that all five specific countries targeted by our
campaign lie within the top six most-prevalent countries,
showing the dependability of Google Adwords’ country
targeting feature. We also note the relatively low per-
centage of TLS-proxied traffic from China. Before this
study the authors hypothesized that this country would
have a high amount of TLS-proxied traffic due to its
stance on civil liberties and government surveillance. We
also find that Ukraine, Russia, Egypt and Pakistan all
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Figure 7: Heat-map of TLS proxy prevalence by
country. Highest = 12% proxy rate, lowest =
0% proxy rate
Website Type Connections Proxied Percent Proxied
Popular 5,132,342 20,965 0.41%
Business 1,787,875 7,494 0.42%
Pornographic 3,004,996 12,458 0.41%
Authors’ 2,353,717 9,844 0.42%
Table 8: Proxied connection breakdown by host
type
have a lower TLS-proxy percentage than western nations
such as the United States (0.86%) and the UK (0.77%).
This may be due to the fact that most detected firewall
solutions are of western origin and western install base.
Thus it is possible that the general lower proxy rates in
our target countries is due more to consumer choice and
buying power.
The relative prevalence of TLS proxies by country is
visualized in Figure 7. Low TLS-proxy rates are signified
by blue and gradually transition to red with increasing
proxy rate. The map includes connection data from our
second study in 228 countries and territories.
6.3 Proxy behavior by type of host
The augmented measurement tool used in our second
study connected to various types of hosts: popular,
business, pornographic, and our own. The breakdown
of the prevalence of TLS proxies with respect to each
host type is shown in Table 8 (note that the number
of connections to each type of host is varies due to the
variance in bandwidth and computer performance of our
users). The percentage of proxied traffic to each type
of host is nearly identical. We also find that individual
TLS proxies are also indiscriminate in their behavior
toward these types of hosts. These results suggest that
TLS proxies do not employ blacklists when deciding
which traffic to intercept. Given Huang et al.’s finding
of a 0.20% TLS-proxy rate for Facebook connections,
there is some evidence to suggest that at least some
TLS proxies are employing whitelists when determining
whether to intercept a connection. Facebook’s popularity
far exceeds the popularity of our chosen popular hosts
(we were constrained to hosts which served permissive
Flash socket policy files), so sites akin to it are in a
class of their own. It is possible that many benevolent
TLS proxies are configured to ignore extremely popular
websites run by reputable organizations, perhaps to
preserve some privacy and reduce performance overhead.
6.4 More malware
Our second study revealed a continued presence of
malware in the TLS proxy space. All of our previously
discovered malware was also present in our second study,
with an additional five discoveries: issuer fields contain-
ing the values Objectify Media Inc (1069 connections),
Superfish, Inc. (610 connections), WiredTools LTD (131
connections), Internet Widgits Pty Ltd (67 connections),
and ImpressX OU (16 connections). Web research in-
dicated that all these are malware products and one of
them, Internet Widgits Pty Ltd, has ties to a botnet.
Combined with malware previously identified, malware
in the second study accounted for 2,571 of proxied con-
nections.
One suspicious Issuer Organization field was “kowsar”.
Certificates with this identifier appeared 268 times, and
were retrieved by 266 unique IP addresses. Unlike other
Issuer Organizations we found, this identifier did not
appear to be associated with a large organization (which
would indicate a corporate firewall) or a personal firewall
product. The IP addresses given this certificate are from
numerous countries around the world and from many
different ISPs. Contrast this with the Certificate Issuer
“DSP”, which appeared 204 times, but with only one IP.
In this case, “DSP” is being used by the Department of
Social and Family Affairs (also called the Department of
Social Protection), Ireland, and thus likely represents a
corporate firewall. The pattern for “kowsar” is indicative
of either a popular personal firewall or an active attack
such as a botnet.
Similar oddities appear, but on a smaller scale. For
example, the Certificate Issuer field “Information Tech-
nology” appeared 33 times, covering 3 IP addresses.
These IPs were from a Japanese chemical company, an
ISP in Netherlands, and a chapter of the American Red
Cross. These are such disparate organizations that this
looks like suspicious behavior, though it is possible that
each of these organizations set up a corporate firewall
and chose the same name for the certificate they gener-
ated. The Issuer field “MYInternetS” appeared 36 times
from 6 different ISPs. Five of these are in Denmark,
from a variety of ISPs and a university, yet one is from
a cable subscriber in the United States. It is difficult
to determine whether cases like this are examples of
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malware.
Even more worrisome are the 5,455 instances where
we could not identify the issuer, and the 1,518 where the
issuer field is null or blank. Whoever set up the TLS
proxy in these cases did not want to be identified.
7. MITIGATION
A large body of work seeks to detect and prevent
TLS proxies, generally regarding them as MitM attacks.
Clark and van Oorschot [10] provide an extensive survey
of this area and provide one of the few research papers
that acknowledges the existence of benevolent TLS prox-
ies. Below we survey the various mitigation approaches
in the field.
Multi-path probing allows clients to determine whether
the certificate they have been given for a server is differ-
ent from those seen by most other clients. Representative
systems include Perspectives [46], Convergence [32], and
DoubleCheck [4]. Crossbear [23] goes a step further
to use traceroute to localize the origin of the attack.
Other systems use existing Certificate Authorities or
centralized notaries to vouch for the authenticity of a
certificate [17, 6, 7]. Each of these systems may suffer
from false alarms due to benign changes to certificates
and the presence of multiple valid certificates for a given
site [5].
There are several proposals to leverage the shared
password between the client and server to prevent a MitM
attack. Direct Validation of Certificates (DVCert) [12]
permits the server to attest to the authenticity of all the
certificates used in a session with the web application,
including certificates from other domains. SSL/TLS
Session-Aware User Authentication [39, 40] thwarts TLS
MitM attacks through user authentication tokens based
on client credentials and TLS session information. The
proposed TLS-SRP protocol [44] would extend the TLS
handshake to support mutual authentication based on a
shared password.
Several proposals leverage DNS to prevent MitM at-
tacks. ConfiDNS [41] utilizes the temporal and spatial
redundancy of the existing DNS system to assess agree-
ment for IP resolution. The DNS-Based Authentication
of Named Entities (DANE) [21] protocol enables admin-
istrators to bind hostnames to their certificates. This
permits public keys to be transmitted via DNSSEC
without involving a CA.
Certificate pinning [18] is a Google proposal for the
web server to limit all future HTTPS connections to a
limited set of server certificates. Pinning is a trust-on-
first-use technology. The Google Chrome browser comes
pre-configured with some Google certificates already
pinned in advance so the user does not have the TOFU
issue with those sites. Chrome also trusts any locally in-
stalled trusted roots, so benevolent proxies and malware
can circumvent the pinning process. Trust Assertions
for Certificate Keys (TACK) [33] is a TLS extension for
the server to pin a signing key that must sign all other
keys in the domain.
Another approach is to use an audit log of valid certifi-
cates issued by Certificate Authorities. Representative
work in this area is Certificate Transparency (CT) [29,
42] and the EFF sovereign keys (SK) project [16]. The
Accountable Key Infrastructure (AKI) [28] is a proposal
for new infrastructure to validate public keys and reduce
the reliance on CAs. This system also includes public
log servers that support public validation of certificate
integrity.
A different approach acknowledges that there is an
industry need for TLS inspection to detect malware
or protect intellectual property. Several proposals to
the IETF from industry introduce mechanisms that
would make proxies visible to the other participants
in a chain of TLS connections and could include user
notification and consent [35, 31]. Another proposal [38]
introduces an extension to TLS that enables a client to
share decryption keys with a TLS proxy. A potential
drawback is that the key-sharing mechanism represents a
new attack surface that hackers could attempt to exploit
to acquire the decryption keys for a TLS session.
8. RELATED WORK
The most closely related work in this field is a recent
paper by Huang et al., which independently develops
a measurement tool that is very similar to ours and
conducts a measurement study of TLS proxies that in-
tercept the Facebook website [24]. We discussed the
primary differences in methodology in Section 1. Gen-
erally speaking, the advantage of Huang’s methodology
is that they find proxies specifically targeting Facebook,
whereas the advantage of our methodology is that we
can target our measurements for selected countries and
for selected websites that have permissive Flash socket
policy files. This enables us to actively collect a broader
measurement of proxies.
In comparing our results to Huang, the prevalence
of proxies in our study is roughly twice what was mea-
sured by Huang (0.41% versus 0.20%). In addition,
we find a wider array of malware, deceptive practices,
and suspicious circumstances. Both of these results are
likely due to the more comprehensive measurements we
make, avoiding a site such as Facebook that is likely on
the whitelist for many proxies. Our measurements of
WebMakerPlus, Objectify Media, Superfish, WiredTools,
Internet Widgits Pty, ImpressX, and kowsar all repre-
sent malware found only in our study. Likewise, the
presence of spam infections from Sweesh and AtomPark
are unique to our study, as is the evidence of botnets
using TLS proxies. We are the first to identify a parental
filter replacing an untrusted certificate with a trusted
one. Our country-specific measurement campaigns add
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additional data to the field.
The only other paper to find evidence of TLS proxies
is the work from The Netalyzer project, which analyzes
the root store of Android devices [45]. Their primary
findings include the use of manufacturer and vendor-
specific certificates, the presence of unusual root certs,
and third party apps that manipulate the root store.
In addition, they find one case of a TLS proxy, out of
15,000 assessed TLS sessions. The app whitelists several
sites, including Facebook, Twitter, and several Google
sites, but intercepts mail from Yahoo, Google, and traffic
to several major banks. It is difficult to compare the
prevalence (1 in 15K) to rates found by Huang and
this paper because the sample is from users choosing to
download the Netalyzer App.
Another closely related paper is the Crossbear sys-
tem [23], which is designed for volunteer hunters to work
together to detect and localize real-world TLS MitM
attacks. After the client establishes a TLS connection to
a website, the client sends the received certificate chain
to a central Crossbear server. The Crossbear server
establishes its own secure connection with the website
and also queries Convergence for additional data about
the website’s certificate. This information is recorded in
a database on the server and is also sent to the client.
If the cumulative data received by the client suggest a
MitM is present, the client performs a traceroute opera-
tion to the malicious server and sends that information
to the Crossbear server. The Crossbear server attempts
to localize the origin of the MitM attacker by using
traceroute data from many Crossbear clients. Crossbear
was deployed in 150 locations on the PlanetLab testbed
and had not detected any attacks (or benevolent TLS
proxies) at the time of the report.
Finally, a number of surveys collect and analyze SSL
certificates and certificate authorities on the Internet
[15, 22, 3, 13, 5]. These studies do not examine the use
of substitute certificates by TLS proxies, but focus on
issues such as TLS errors, properties of certificates and
the PKI system, and poor security practices.
9. CONCLUSION
Using an automatic measurement tool and two large-
scale measurement campaigns via Google AdWords, we
expose a variety of TLS proxies worldwide. We find that
overall, 0.41% of all connections tested are behind a TLS
proxy. Given that both benevolent and malicious uses of
TLS proxies use similar if not identical methodologies,
distinguishing between the two is a difficult task. For
example, analysis of substitute certificate fields shows
that most TLS proxies claim to be acting on behalf of
concerned users, behaving as firewalls for both personal
and business use. However, since TLS proxies violate the
normal hierarchy of trust, it is impossible to verify the
claims made in those fields. Despite this, we have found
eight distinct, self-identifying malware which proxied
over 3,600 of our total connections. The prevalence of
malware using TLS proxying techniques illustrates the
need for stronger controls over the root stores of browsers
and operating systems. Even more TLS proxy instances
chose to remain entirely anonymous by providing indis-
cernible or no information in substitute certificate data.
Our additional findings of telecom-run TLS proxies, null
issuer fields, and falsified certificate authority signatures
further highlight the need for transparency in this area.
We stress the need for better systems in the browser
and/or operating system to assist in both user awareness
and distinguishing between benevolent and malicious
uses of TLS proxies.
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